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Abstract. Disruptive technologies can be conceptualized in different ways. 
Depending on how they are conceptualized, different ethical issues come into 
play. This article contributes to a general framework to navigate the ethics of 
disruptive technologies. It proposes three basic distinctions to be included in such 
a framework. First, emerging technologies may instigate localized “first-order” 
disruptions, or systemic “second-order” disruptions. The ethical significance of 
these disruptions differs: first-order disruptions tend to be of modest ethical 
significance, whereas second-order disruptions are highly significant. Secondly, 
technologies may be classified as disruptive based on their technological features 
or based on their societal impact. Depending on which of these classifications 
one adopts and takes as the starting point of ethical inquiry, different ethical 
questions are foregrounded. Thirdly, the ethics of disruptive technology raises 
concerns at four different levels of technology assessment: the technology level, 
the artifact level, the application level, and the society level. The respective 
suitability of approaches in technology ethics to address concerns about 
disruptive technologies co-varies with the respective level of analysis. The article 
clarifies these distinctions, thereby laying some of the groundwork for an ethical 
framework tailored for assessing disruptive technologies.    
Keywords: ethics of technology, emerging technologies, disruptive technology, 
systemic disruption, ethics of disruption 
1 Introduction 
The ethics of disruptive technologies is an emerging topic of academic interest. 
Scholarly initiatives that bear testimony to this claim include the overarching project in 
which the present research has been undertaken – the Dutch interuniversity research 
project Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies (ESDiT, 2020-2029) [1] – as well as 
the DiTTEt 2021 Proceedings [2], which is the venue of this article. Policymakers, too, 
are increasingly interested in the ethical dimensions of technological disruption. 
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Consider the European Commission’s legislative proposal for an Artificial Intelligence 
Act [3], in which the term “disruption” is used in several places, to highlight the 
Commission’s aim of creating legal and social frameworks that are “resilient to 
disruption.” Tech ethics and disruption are not just on the minds of scholars, but also 
high up on political agendas.   
Yet whenever ethical discussions come to bear on “disruptive technologies”, 
confusions abound. This is largely due to the fact that the concepts of “disruption” and 
“disruptive technologies” are widely used, but with different connotations, none of 
which is original to ethical scholarship itself. One influential usage goes back to the 
work of Clayton Christensen, who coined the term “disruptive technology” and 
popularized its use in the context of his disruptive innovation theory [4]. On 
Christensen’s account, technologies should be designated as disruptive if they perform 
poorly as measured by initial consumer standards, but are able to overtake markets 
nonetheless, by scoring high on ancillary performance metrics that consumers 
subsequently begin to value. While certainly relevant to analyses of business and 
innovation, this understanding of disruptive technologies is not ideally suited for ethics. 
Its main drawback is that Christensen’s conceptualization of disruptive technologies is 
strongly theory-laden – i.e. geared towards the theoretical framework of disruptive 
innovation theory – and somewhat idiosyncratic as a result. Indeed, various authors 
have criticized Christensen’s conceptual framework [5,6], among others because it fails 
to capture colloquial intuitions about which technologies count as disruptive [7]. 
Christensen himself, too, became less eager to employ the term “disruptive technology” 
over the course of his career, and preferably referred to “disruptive innovation”, 
flagging his own reservations about the appropriateness of the former concept in the 
context of disruptive innovation theory. 
In the face of some of the limitations of Christensen’s own rendering of disruptive 
technologies, alternative conceptualizations of disruptive technologies have emerged in 
recent years, which tend to be more ecumenical. On their broader understanding, 
disruptive technologies are simply those that displace existing technologies, shake 
industries, or create entirely new industries. [2] Various emerging technologies serve 
as examples here, such as AI, IoT, blockchain, 4G, CRISPR/Cas9 – some of the usual 
suspects in recent foresight reports shortlisting the anticipated disruptive technologies 
of the next years or decades [8,9,10]. Additionally, “digital disruption” has gained 
currency as a way of referring to the digital transformation of existing products and 
business models. [11] The emerging discourse on digital disruption diverges from 
Christensen’s work by recentering scholarly discussions on technology (rather than 
innovation) and on the colloquial notion of disruption, with its broader connotations 
than Christensen’s account. As such, digital disruption discourse has a better fit with 
the ethical domain, since ethical concerns are not – and should obviously not be 
rendered – sensitive to the peculiarities of disruption in Christensen’s sense. 
That said, the conceptual scope of recent work on digital disruption is still limited. 
Academic discussions of digital disruption are largely restricted to marketing and 
business studies, focusing on the disruption of consumer markets, industries, and 
business models. But technologies have the potential to disrupt much more than that. 
They can also disrupt institutions and social relations. Indeed, the archetypical 
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disruptive technologies of the 21st century are often ascribed a potential to 
fundamentally alter human nature and our place in the world. These kinds of disruptions 
are more salient in ethical terms, compared to disruptions of market and business 
models. Moreover, they are the kinds of disruptions that contemporary attempts at 
political legislation seek to address. Such legislation is typically not concerned with 
market disruptions in any strict sense, but rather with fundamental disruptions of human 
life and society, which the emerging technologies of our current age are anticipated to 
bring about.  
Dissatisfied with this limited focus, some scholars have recently argued for a broader 
understanding of disruptive technologies, which pays tribute to its social, legal and 
political implications. Schuelke-Leech [12] makes the useful distinction between first-
order and second-order disruptions: whereas the former pertain to local market 
disruptions, the latter are associated with systematic disruptions at a much larger 
societal scale. Building on the ESDiT project [1], in my own work I have introduced 
the notion of “deep disruptions”. These are disruptions that pertain to basic concepts 
and categories of thought, deeply held values and fixed points of human existence and 
normative interactions [13] – for instance, challenges to basic ethical concepts such as 
“autonomy” and “agency”, or alterations of human capabilities and basic needs. While 
Schuelke-Leech’s notion of second-order disruptions concerns the breadth of 
disruptive impacts – the various domains of social life that disruptive technologies 
affect – the depth of technological disruptions reflects technologies’ capacity to 
fundamentally remake our society and ourselves in terms of our conceptual and ethical 
self-understanding. Broad as well as deep disruptions are obviously of great societal 
and ethical importance – and more so than first-order disruptions, which are the primary 
focus of the disruptive innovation and digital disruption frameworks. Hence, to the 
extent that the ethics of disruptive technologies limits itself to the narrow accounts of 
Christensen and his successors, it runs the risk of overlooking the most significant and 
pressing ethical issues.  
Instead, a broader understanding of disruptive technologies is called for, with the 
dual aim of identifying core ethical concerns that technological disruption gives rise to, 
and of identifying and devising ethical approaches that can help to address such 
concerns. The aim of the present article is to outline some foundational distinctions that 
can help in generating an ethical framework specifically tailored for disruptive 
technologies in this broader sense. It does so in three steps. Section 2 elaborates on the 
abovementioned distinction between localized “first-order” disruptions and systemic 
“second-order” disruptions and explains why their ethical significance differs. Section 
3 highlights that technologies may be classified as disruptive based on their 
technological features or based on their societal impacts. Depending on which of these 
classifications one adopts and takes as the starting point of ethical inquiry, different 
ethical questions arise and different ethical toolkits are needed. Section 4 distinguishes 
between four different levels at which ethical concerns raised by disruptive 
technologies can be identified and suggests that the suitability of different approaches 
in tech ethics depends, at least in part, on the target level of analysis. Section 5 
concludes that the foregoing distinctions can assist ethicists and policymakers in 
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coming up with a comprehensive framework for the ethical assessment of disruptive 
technologies. 
2 Localized vs. Systemic Disruptions 
In mapping the ethical landscape of disruptive technologies, Schuelke-Leech’s [12] 
distinction between first- and second-order disruptions provides a helpful starting point. 
First-order disruptive technologies serve to transform markets and industries, but do so 
in localized fashion: changes are restricted to specific domains, and do not ripple 
through society. Consider the replacement in floppy-disks of ferrite heads and oxide 
disks by thin-filmed components during the 1980s. This constituted a technological 
disruption, that transformed the market of information storage [14]. But while this is a 
text-book example of a technological disruption, the disruption did not transform 
society at large: the impacts of the disruption were predominantly restricted to changes 
in the respective consumer domain.  
Ethical issues that come into play regarding first-order disruptive technologies are 
domain-specific. How pronounced such issues are depends on the ethical significance 
of the respective domain, and the values that are at stake. Disruptions in the market of 
medical technologies, for instance, are likely to be ethically significant, as medical 
technologies tend to connect with morally laden issues regarding human health, 
longevity, well-being, equal access and vulnerability. Or consider Uber’s disruption of 
the taxi market, which, too, may be regarded as a morally significant first-order 
disruptive innovation: the disappearance of standardized taxi-fees, and the changing 
availability of taxis in areas according to supply and demand, touches on issues of 
fairness and equal access.  
Other first-order disruptive technologies have consumer impacts that are less 
morally significant. Consider the invention of single serve plastic coffee capsules in the 
1990s [15]. This innovation has disrupted the coffee market, but as of yet it has not had 
any large-scale effects beyond that. Its ethical significance seems limited; the ease of 
preparing coffee is not a strong determinant of the quality of society. That said, the 
disruption is not entirely devoid of ethical significance. For instance, it has had effects 
on the labor market and on plastic waste production, which in turn are related to social 
and ethical values such as well-being and sustainability. While their ethically relevant 
impacts may be limited and indirect, one would be hard-pressed to find examples of 
first-order disruptions that are entirely devoid of ethical significance.   
Yet the ethical significance of second-order disruptions is certainly more 
pronounced, and invariably so (Fig. 1). This should come as no surprise. Second-order 
disruptions arise through the interaction of multiple first-order disruptive technologies 
within a complex innovation ecosystem [12]. They serve to transform society at large, 
in large part as a consequence of unintended features and dynamics to which they give 
rise – dual use, technological unemployment, the merger with other technologies and 
with socio-economic developments, and so on. Consider the impact of blockchain 
technology, which ripple through society. Like the advanced floppy disk, blockchain 
has altered the fundamental techniques of storing public data. But it has also begun to 
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alter practices in a range of other social domains, such as finance, administration, 
cybersecurity, industrial production, insurance, and public health [16]. The fact that 
they have a multiplicity of impact domains, thereby compromising basic architectures 
that strongly determine the quality of society, is what makes second-order disruptions 
highly significant in ethical terms. Given the different scope and nature of the ethical 
concerns that second-order disruptions give rise to – for instance regarding foresight, 
uncertainty, risk, value conflicts and incommensurability – it seems helpful to preserve 
the distinction between first- and second-order disruptions in ethical discourse. 
  
Fig. 1. The ethical significance of disruptive technologies. 
 
One aspect of an ethics of disruptive technologies is to come up with an integrated 
ethical assessment of second-order disruptive technologies. By their very nature these 
technologies affect multiple social domains – and their impacts may be ethically 
desirable in some of them, but undesirable in others. The daunting yet important task 
for ethicists – as well as innovators – is to map the full breadth of domains that are 
implicated by the technology, both intendedly and unintendedly so. Subsequently, such 
information may be used as input for regulatory frameworks [3], and to give impetus 
to processes of responsible innovation and Value Sensitive Design (VSD) [17]. Given 
that social disruptions often come about with an overturning of existing institutions and 
regulatory checks and balances [18], an important further ethical task is to figure out 
which regulatory voids and responsibility gaps disruptive technologies give rise to, and 
how such gaps can be mended. Additionally, articulating an ethical framework for 
corporate social responsibility – even in the face of the uncertainty that disruption 
engenders – will be a core exercise to advance this subfield of tech ethics.   
3 Tech as Agent of Social Disruption vs. Tech Entangled in 
Social Disruption 
When analyzing socially disruptive technologies, there are two potential starting points 
of ethical assessment. On the one hand, we may start by looking at features of the 
technology in question and distill what makes them disruptive. This approach 
foregrounds the role of technology in instigating social disruption. Note that this 
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involves the simplifying assumption that a technology can be inherently disruptive. 
Strictly speaking, this assumption is false: technologies are only disruptive in the 
context of a specific technological ecology or societal setting, which they serve to 
transform. Differently put, disruption is always tethered to a given technosocial context. 
That said, focusing on the “inherently disruptive” features of a technology can be a 
useful simplification, especially if the effects of the technology are (anticipated to be) 
invariant to a wide range of social contexts. 
An alternative starting point is to first zoom in on the dynamics of a given disruption 
that is taking place in society, and subsequently flesh out which technologies are 
associated with this disruption. For instance, we might zoom in on the so-called “social 
credit system” being developed in China, and subsequently ponder how it is affected  
by emerging technologies, such as sensor technology and big data analytics. Hence, we 
move from an apparent social disruption to the technologies involved in it. Oftentimes, 
this will put the spotlights on a range of disruptive technologies, rather than just one of 
them.1 
These different starting points serve to foreground somewhat different ethical issues. 
The first starting point brings to the fore ethical issues that have to do with the activity 
of disrupting, and places emphasis on the responsibility of tech-engineers as disruptors. 
How can disruptors be responsible innovators? Is it responsible to develop a potentially 
disruptive technological product in the first place? Such questions invite reflections that 
depart from design approaches in the ethics of technology [17]. Additionally, a focus 
on technologies and technological products is amenable to ethical foresight approaches 
[19]. What kinds of disruptions can we anticipate to occur, considering the specific 
features of a technology and the affordances it engenders?  
The second, society-centered starting point foregrounds a different set of issues. It 
brings into focus questions of societal response and responsiveness. How do we design 
adequate social institutions and legal frameworks to cope with disruptions? How do we 
create a societal infrastructure that is resilient to emerging technologies, and helps to 
preserve core ethical values? The primary focus here is on questions of societal uptake, 
rather than technology design. Approaches in political philosophy and bioethics, among 
others, offer useful tools to broach these issues.    
 
 
1 Alternatively, the social credit system might itself be conceptualized as a (second-order) 
disruptive technology. Doing so presupposes a broad and implementation-oriented account of 
what “technology” can amount to (see section 4). The ethical focus, on this conceptualization, is 
with the broader dynamics of technosocial disruption. 
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Fig. 2. Two different ethical foci: (A) tech as social disruptor vs. (B) tech as implicated 
in processes social disruption. 
 
In sum, we can distinguish between an “ethics of tech disruptors” and an “ethics of 
technosocial disruption.” These need not be regarded as rivalling approaches: both have 
a legitimate place in the ethics of disruptive technologies. Depending on the kinds of 
ethical questions one wants to address, however, or the kind of regulatory framework 
one wants to devise, one approach may be better suited than the other. 
4 Four Levels of Ethical Analysis 
Many of the emerging and early adoption technologies which are arising and fusing in 
the current “fourth industrial revolution”, such as AI, IoT, blockchain, additive 
manufacturing, 5G, sensor technology, advanced food technology, CRISPR/Cas9, 
neurotechnology and nanotechnology, have been described as disruptive technologies. 
The same holds for emerging or anticipated technologies that have potential to radically 
transform society in the further future, such as climate engineering, de-extinction, and 
quantum computing. These technologies comprise a rather diverse list: not only do they 
pertain to different domains, but the technologies are also described at different levels 
of granularity. In fact, they often seem to pertain to rather different kinds of entities.  
Technology is an incredibly broad term, and it is not at all straightforward how to 
define it. The meaning of technology has changed over time [20], it has been 
conceptualized in myriad ways [21,22], and there is something of an emerging 
consensus that the term “technology” is polysemous [23]. Recent scholars have 
pinpointed at least three different basic referents of the term [24,25,26]:  
a) The body of knowledge that constitutes a field of engineering. 
b) The technical artifacts that a field of engineering gives rise to. 
c) A set of applications that technical artifacts give rise to. 
One might think of these as three distinct levels at which technologies can be identified 
and analyzed. While the entities referred to at each level may all be generically labelled 
“technologies”, they clearly differ amongst each other. 
In the field of technology ethics, a threefold classification of technologies along 
these lines is engrained in the framework of Anticipatory Technology Ethics (ATE), 
which is used to identify ethical issues regarding emerging technologies [25,26]. Within 
A. Tech as agent of social disruption
• Primary assessment: disruptive potential
of technologies
• Features of a disruptive technology provide
the starting point of ethical inquiry
• "Technologies" conceptualized in terms of
technological artifacts, or fields of R&D
and their constitutitive techniques
• Focus on responsibility of innovators and
disruptors
B. Tech entangled in social disruption
• Primary assessment: technological
disruptions in society
• Technosocial disruptions provide the
starting point of ethical inquiry
• "Technologies" often conceptualized in
terms of technological applications, or
contexts of implementation
• Focus on societal response to disruptions
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the ATE-approach, these levels are called a) the technology level, b) the artifact level, 
and c) the application level. These three levels of analysis correspond with the three 
abovementioned ways in which technologies can be conceptualized: in terms of the 
techniques they employ (e.g. additive manufacturing), in terms of their constitutive 
procedures and artifacts (e.g. bioplastics), or in terms of their applications (e.g. 
battlefield drones). 
At each of these levels of description, different ethical issues arise. For purposes of 
the ethical assessment of emerging technologies, therefore, it is useful to hold these 
three levels distinct.2 In what follows, I follow the ATE-framework in providing a 
sketch of the ethics of disruptive technologies at each of these levels. I depart from the 
ATE-framework in including a fourth level of analysis – the society level – which 
focuses on the entire social context which is shaped in the co-evolutionary dynamics 
with emerging technologies. Taken together, these four levels of analysis provide a 
birds-eye’s view of the landscape of disruptive technology ethics.  
 
4.1 The Technology Level 
First, consider the most general level of analysis – the technology level – which focuses 
on the basic material techniques involved in a technology, as developed, for instance, 
in fields of engineering, or deployed in medical intervention. Disruptions, at this level, 
have to do with features that are intrinsic to the techniques being employed, which are 
changing the respective fields of technology. Take CRISPR/Cas9, which is rapidly 
transforming the field of gene-editing, as it substantially improves on precursor gene-
editing techniques. In virtue of its constitutive techniques, CRISPR provides much 
greater precision in gene-editing, and it has made gene-editing a more effective and 
powerful tool. Yet it also brings along new kinds of unintended side-effects. For 
instance, it appears that when using CRIPSR in human embryos, unintended DNA 
changes adjacent to the target side can be brought about, which lead to unwanted 
genetic changes [27]. These accidental changes – which may be inherent side-effects 
of the technique itself – raise ethical worries about the technology as such.  
 
4.2 The Artifact Level 
Secondly, consider the artifact level. This level focuses on the usable products of a 
technology. This includes technical artifacts, such as bioplastics, as well as technical 
procedures, such as the process of carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Disruptions, at this 
level, have to do with features that are intrinsic to the respective artifacts and 
procedures. Take bioplastics, which are plastic materials produced from renewable 
organic matter. In virtue of their biochemical composition, bioplastics facilitate a more 
circular flow of material, making bioplastics a potential disruptor of the linear economy. 
CDR refers to the long-term removal, capture or sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
 
2  Doing so can be difficult at times. There are boundary cases, in which it is not obvious what 
constitutes the appropriate level of description. This is a general challenge for the ATE-
framework. For present purposes, I gloss over this complication.   
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from the atmosphere. By its very nature this procedure alters the planetary carbon cycle. 
As a result, CDR has potential to play a disruptive role in mitigating global warming. 
 
4.3 The Application Level 
Thirdly, consider the application level. This level is concerned with the concrete use of 
a technological artifact or procedure for a given purpose, or its configuration and 
implementation in a given context. For instance, battlefield drones are an application 
of drones in military contexts; care robots are a way of configuring robots for a specific 
set of tasks; smart cities involve the implementation of IoT and sensor technology in 
urban environments. Technological disruptiveness, at this level, is tied to contexts of 
use. Arguably, battlefield drones hold great potential to disrupt existing military 
practices, and care robots might have a similarly disruptive impact on existing systems 
of social care. Technological products create new affordances and constraints, thereby 
facilitating new social practices and altering existing ones. To the extent that these 
practices are rapidly transformed by emerging technologies, they may count as 
instances of social disruption.  
 
4.4 The Society Level 
Lastly, consider the societal level. This level looks at the general technosocial dynamics 
which are implicated by emerging technologies. For instance, smartphones have 
disrupted practices of human communication and information retrieval; deepfake 
technologies are disrupting systems of online trust and online identity. Sometimes, 
technologies are conceptualized directly in terms of their context of social 
implementation – one might speak, for instance, of “surveillance capitalism 
technologies” or “climate mitigation technologies”. Disruption, at the society level, 
pertains to the breaking down of a stable historical trajectory, an entrenched state-of-
affairs, or a social equilibrium, for instance with regard to norms and institutions. There 
are various domains of societal impact that disruptive technologies might have. Broadly 
understood, these include not only the structure of society itself, but also disruptions to 
the natural and planetary environment.  
 
4.5 Ethical Approaches at Different Levels 
Which ethical approach had best be adopted to tackle questions of disruption? This 
depends, of course, on the nature of the questions at issue, and the aims of ethical 
inquiry. But arguably it also depends, at least in part, on which of the four levels I have 
outlined in this section is at stake. While for some purposes one might want to advance 
a comprehensive ethical analysis, which incorporates all four levels of analysis, one 
might also be concerned with an ethical issue at one specific level. The suitability of 
different approaches in technology ethics to address concerns about disruptive 
technologies co-varies with the level of analysis of concern: some approaches are 
particularly helpful at the technology level, others at the levels of artifact, application, 
or society. 
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This differential suitability can be elucidated with reference to a central dilemma 
that the ethics of tech-disruption has to confront: the Collingridge-dilemma [28]. When 
a technology is at an early stage of development, it is still malleable and its direction of 
development can be influenced, but its effects on society are difficult to predict. When 
a technology is societally entrenched, its impacts have become clear, but it is now very 
difficult to alter the technology. Ethicists therefore face a choice: do they tailor their 
approaches to the early stages of technology development, accepting uncertainty about 
the technology’s eventual deployment, or do they tailor their approaches the later stage 
of societal implementation, accepting that it will be very difficult to alter the technology 
at this point?  
Different approaches in technology ethics can be understood as providing different 
answers to this question [29]. The aptitude of these answers, in turn, depends in part on 
the level of analysis at which ethical concerns play out. Consider four families of 
approaches in technology ethics:  
 
i) Ethical foresight approaches [19], such as the aforementioned ATE-approach 
[25,26];  
ii)  Ethical design approaches, such as the VSD-approach [17];  
iii)  Ethical mediation approaches, such as the Technological Mediation approach 
[30]; 
iv)  Ethical experimentation approaches, such as the Sociotechnical 
Experimentation approach [31].  
 
Foresight approaches tend to be most useful at the technology and artifact level. At 
the society level foresight approaches become exceedingly difficult, as the dynamics of 
societal uptake are incredibly complex and difficult to anticipate. Design ethics 
approaches, by contrast, are difficult to apply at the most basic level of R&D. These 
approaches are more readily invoked at the artifact and application levels. Moral 
mediation approaches have a more concrete and implementation-based focus still. They 
most naturally lend themselves for analysis at the application level, where users interact 
with technologies. Lastly, sociotechnical experimentation approaches are most readily 
invoked at the society level, where foresight is extremely difficult. Rather than 
speculating about what might occur, this approach looks at “social experiments” 
actually taking place in society and seeks to ethically accompany and regulate them.  
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Fig. 3. The respective strengths of different families of approaches in technology ethics. 
These approaches can be regarded as providing different answers to the Collingridge-
dilemma. 
 
This overview should not be taken to imply that said approaches should be confined 
to the respective levels, at least not in any strict sense. Instead, the point is that as ethical 
tools, they are specifically well adapted for assessment at some levels, and less so at 
others – albeit with ample overlap. This ties in with the suggestion that these approaches 
are not exclusive but complementary. They – together with several other approaches 
that have been developed in the ethics of technology, and in the field of ethics more 
generally – are part of the pluralist arsenal of approaches that ethicists can adopt to 
scrutinize disruptive technologies. 
5 Conclusion 
This article has outlined three basic distinctions that can help one to navigate the ethics 
of disruptive technologies. To what extent does this analysis suggest that disruptive 
technologies constitute a distinct class, that merits specific ethical concern? Some of 
the distinctions outlined above, such as the four different levels technology analysis 
presented in section four, pertain to the ethics of emerging technologies more generally. 
Yet others are specific to issues concerning disruptive technologies. This holds for the 
distinction between first- and second-order disruptions, as well as the distinction 
between technologies as instigators of disruption, versus technologies as components 
in the broader dynamics of technosocial disruption. A next step is to work out these 
basic distinctions into more fully-fledged normative assessment frameworks. Hence, 
future efforts to further develop the ethics of disruptive technologies as a of subfield of 
technology ethics should be encouraged. Such efforts are likely to benefit the work of 
ethicists and policymakers, on a topic of great societal importance.   
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